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Financial Liberalization and 
International Capital Flows
The first section of this chapter is coauthored by Nancy Auerbach. The rest of the chapter is 
coauthored by Yoonmin Kim and Thana Sompornserm.
It is interesting that domestic and international financial liberalization are 
among the most often cited causes of the 1997–98 crisis. Liberalization in 
the Asian crisis countries took place prior to the crisis as did large capital in-
flows, many of which reversed during the crisis in the classic pattern of capi-
tal flow bonanzas ending in sudden stops (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía 2008; 
Reinhart and Reinhart 2008; Sula and Willett 2009). Furthermore, China and 
India, with much less general financial liberalization and a continuing array 
of capital controls, were little hit by the crisis. Malaysia’s experiment with 
increasing capital controls during the crisis, while not the resounding success 
that some enthusiasts suggested, was certainly not the catastrophe that many 
critics predicted. As a result, in many quarters support for financial liberaliza-
tion suffered a strong blow.
The free-market euphoria that followed the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union had burst. The massive reversal toward greater financial controls that 
was predicted with glee by some and with fear by others did not come to 
pass, however. The IMF became more circumspect in its preaching for lib-
eralization.28 Controls in some countries were increased, but in many others, 
such as Korea, the crisis spurred further and more balanced liberalization 
but combined with efforts to improve prudential regulation and financial 
supervision.
This was a wise response. A careful look at the previous financial liberaliza-
tion in Korea and many other countries suggests that the major problems 
28.  In actuality, the IMF had generally been more nuanced in its advocacy of liberalization 
than many of its critics charged; see IEO (2005; 2007).
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were not caused by financial liberalization per se, but by the perverse ways in 
which it was done. It was more their strong economic fundamentals than their 
capital controls that protected China and India from the 1997–98 crisis (Wil-
lett et al. 2005). Furthermore several studies have found positive rather than 
negative correlations between measures of capital controls and the frequency 
of currency crises (Potchamanawong et al. 2008). There are sufficient dif-
ficulties with the various quantitative measures of capital controls currently 
available (Potchamanawong et al. 2008)29 to keep one from being confident 
that capital controls are a strong cause of crises, but the evidence certainly 
supports caution about the belief that capital controls provide strong protec-
tion against crises.
Perverse Liberalization before 1997
When we look at the Korean experience we see that the liberalization that 
preceded the 1997–98 crisis was quite partial and frequently violated stan-
dard economic advice about how liberalization should proceed. A large litera-
ture has been developed by economic theorists and practitioners alike about 
the necessary preconditions and sequencing needed for liberalization to work 
well. Not surprisingly considerable disagreement about optimal sequencing 
still exists, but experts have arrived at a considerable degree of consensus that 
some paths work much better than others. What has become much clearer 
from the rash of crises during the past decade is that not only do some paths 
work less well, but that they can be disastrous.
The total amount of domestic and international financial liberalization un-
dertaken by Korea before the 1997–98 crisis was much less than is often 
assumed, and most of the qualitative measures of the level of international 
capital controls in Korea and several of the other Asian crisis countries were 
still fairly high (Willett et al. 2005). This may help explain the positive as-
sociation that some studies have found between capital controls and crises. A 
nontrivial amount of financial liberalization did begin in Korea in the early 
1990s and was accelerated by the program agreed to as part of Korea’s entry 
into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
but Marcus Noland (2005, 17) in his study of Korea’s experience with liber-
alization and international capital flows concluded that, even with the com-
pletion of the OECD application plan, “the South Korean financial system 
would have remained among the most repressed in Asia.”
29.  Using a more detailed new measure of capital control developed by Potchamanawong 
(2007) that distinguishes between controls on inflows and outflows, Potchamanawong et al. 
(2008) find that crises are associated more strongly with controls on outflows than on inflows. 
An example of the problems with the quantitative measures of capital controls is that the 
widely used measure of Chinn and Ito (2006) shows an increase in controls for Korea before 
the 1997 crisis, while qualitative discussions indicate there was a reduction. The measures 
developed by Potchamanawong (2007) and Schindler (2009) do show a decrease.
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The liberalization did not result primarily from a conversion of Korean poli-
cymakers to neoliberal ideas. As Noland (2005, 38) puts it, “the liberaliza-
tion undertaken in the early 1990s was less a product of textbook economic 
analysis than of parochial politicking. . . . Neither South Korean government 
officials nor the intelligentsia evidenced much ideological commitment to 
the notion of freer financial markets. . . .” This helps explain why, from the 
standpoint of standard economic analysis, a number of basic mistakes were 
made.
The state of the Korean financial system was not strong as the liberalization 
process began. Noland (2005, 20) describes it as “bureaucratized, bloated, 
and backwards.” Under the old system of government support and directed 
credit, there was little incentive for Korean financial institutions to invest 
substantial resources to develop strong capabilities in credit analysis and risk 
management. As Frederic Mishkin (2006, 87) comments in his analysis of 
Korea’s precrisis financial system, “Because of the government safety net for 
the chaebols [which were generally considered to be too big to fail], banks 
had little need to develop a credit culture.”
These capabilities cannot be developed overnight, so strong regulatory over-
sight is particularly important in early stages of liberalization. And, as we 
have discovered from the U.S. subprime crisis, even in mature financial sys-
tems this is true with respect to the development of new types of financial 
arrangements. As has been true in many other countries, Korea’s initial fi-
nancial liberalization was not accompanied by a strong boost to regulatory 
oversight. Mishkin (2006, 87) offers a likely reason for this failure: “Just as 
in Mexico, lax banking regulation and supervision [in Korea] were no ac-
cidents. It was in the interests of both the banks and the firms that borrowed 
from them that they be allowed . . . to do their business . . . unfettered by 
bothersome regulations and inspections.”
In Korea, lax prudential regulation allowed heavy concentration of lending 
and the disproportionate growth between Korean banks and nonbank indus-
tries. In the three-year period leading up to the crisis, merchant banks acquired 
$20 billion in foreign debt (Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998, 738). Regulation was 
especially lax for newly licensed merchant banks whose capital requirements 
in proportion to loans were woefully inadequate. The same can be said for 
Thailand. This fact alone significantly further increased the vulnerability of 
the banks to business failure. But the lack of prudential regulation, an act of 
omission, also interacted with the removal of various government restrictions 
on foreign borrowing, an act of commission, to exacerbate banking-sector 
weaknesses. Financial liberalization and tight money kept domestic interest 
rates above world rates, which encouraged domestic banks to rely on for-
eign credit. The pegged exchange rate also encouraged the perception that 
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foreign capital was relatively cheap, contributing to the wave of excessive 
short-term foreign borrowing that was intensified by ineffective prudential 
supervision. And, because private actors considered the pegged exchange 
rate system quite credible, they made borrowing decisions under a false sense 
of security (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 788). But the concentration of 
bad loans leading up to the crisis may not have been due only to the govern-
ment’s encouragement to lend short term through the unintentional creation 
of perverse incentives. There is evidence that government officials supported 
lending to the chaebol by Korean banks even after chaebol profitability had 
fallen sharply (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 602).
One contributor to the financial weakness of the private banking sector has to 
do with the incentives behind bank ownership. Privatization of state-owned 
banks constitutes an important component of the financial reform process. 
Yet the privatization process itself can fall prey to perverse incentives. This 
can be viewed as an incompatibility between political motivations and eco-
nomic incentives, or as political capture of the reform process. Privatization 
in theory should lead to greater overall efficiency as, for example, the private 
sector possesses some comparative advantage over government in making 
profit-maximizing economic decisions. Given the stakes involved, however, 
the privatization process is particularly susceptible to political capture and 
rent seeking, as with the charter of new merchant banks in Korea. The gov-
ernment converted 24 financially weak short-term financing companies into 
merchant banks in two separate rounds: 9 in 1994 and 15 in 1996. The mer-
chant banks then proceeded to engage in risky foreign exchange transactions. 
Among the banks whose licenses were revoked in 1998, 5 were new entrants 
from 1994, and 10 were from 1996. Thus, government reforms seem to have 
encouraged greater debt exposure in an already overexposed financial system 
(Auerbach 2001, 208).
In Korea, moreover, as part of financial reform banks were allowed to open 
and expand operations overseas. As a result, banks expanded their foreign 
currency–denominated business as aggressively as they did their domestic 
loan portfolios. The net result was an increase in foreign currency liabili-
ties of overseas branches that was almost as large as the external debts of 
domestic branches (Dooley and Shin 2000, 9). Nor did this happen only in 
Korea. The number of nonbank financial institutions expanded dramatically 
in Thailand as well prior to the crisis (Furman and Stiglitz 1998, 7). In fact, 
throughout East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, there had been a proliferation of 
new banking and quasi-banking institutions with little equity capital and less 
experience, nearly all engaged directly or indirectly in intermediating foreign 
capital (Katz 1999, 428).
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   61 11/11/2009   4:02:12 PM
62  The Global Crisis and Korea’s International Financial Policies
Obviously the buildup of short-term debt severely weakened the domestic 
banking sectors of crisis countries in Asia. And clearly the governments had 
a lot to do with encouraging short-term debt buildup (Fischer 1999). One way 
to understand why short-term debt skyrocketed with financial deregulation is 
to look at the incentive structures created by state regulation of the financial 
sector before liberalization and to understand that before liberalization those 
perverse incentives might have been held in check by government oversight. 
For example, continued government control over the long-term capital mar-
ket, in the form of window guidance or direct controls over interest rates, cre-
ated a shortage of long-term capital during the earlier rapid growth period in 
most Asian countries. This shortage encouraged the use of short-term credit 
to finance long-term investments. This perverse incentive ultimately led to 
a perverse outcome in the form of a mismatch of borrowing and lending 
terms, which is widely acknowledged to be one of the main ingredients of the 
Asian financial crisis (Katz 1999, 429). Under these conditions, reform may 
encourage market actors to take advantage of pre-existing incentives because 
oversight has diminished.
The starkest example of this kind of perverse incentive is the liberalization 
of the short-term loan market in the context of an already weakened banking 
sector (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 788). When governments in East Asia 
liberalized their banking sectors and capital markets, they began by opening 
up only the short-term maturity end of these markets. Unfortunately, this seg-
ment of the market tends to be characterized not only by short-term horizons 
on the part of investors but also by short-term rent seeking for quick profits 
by banks taking advantage of close ties with government (Katz 1999, 429). 
Some Korean banks actually had a negative net worth when the loan market 
was liberalized. The fact that banks with negative net worth could continue 
to operate obviously is more a function of inadequate prudential regulation in 
the preliberalization period than of liberalization per se. In this context of in-
solvency, however, liberalization may have actually exacerbated the problem 
because banks with negative net worth do face strong (perverse) incentives 
to load up on short-term debt as a means of gambling for redemption in a 
liberalized short-term loan market. That is, if the banking system is unsound 
owing to a large debt overhang or a large percentage of nonperforming loans 
that have not yet been written off, these banks have very little to lose by 
loading up on more risky but potentially highly profitable new loans made 
accessible as a result of liberalization. This is especially true when viewed 
in conjunction with the too-big-to-fail form of moral hazard. In both cases, 
the downside risks of taking on more short-term loan risk are considerably 
discounted in comparison with the upside of redeeming a failing business 
enterprise with the infusion of fresh capital.
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Governments further encouraged the buildup of short-term debt by liberal-
izing the loan market while implicitly lowering the perceived costs of foreign 
borrowing through the pegged exchange rate (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 
788; Dooley and Shin 2000, 5). Most of the crisis country governments sharply 
limited the size of exchange rate fluctuations and fostered the impression that 
the private sector need not worry about the possibility of a large depreciation. 
The substantial differential between high domestic interest rates in the crisis 
countries and low rates in Europe, Japan, and the United States was seen as a 
source of arbitrage profits or low borrowing costs rather than as an indicator 
of differentials in risk (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 603). As a consequence, much 
of the crisis country foreign borrowing went unhedged. Thus, financial-sector 
liberalization and exchange rate policies interacted perversely. In many coun-
tries, often with explicit government encouragement, the private sector came 
to believe that large exchange rate depreciations would not be allowed, or, if 
such changes did occur, nationals would be compensated by the government 
(Krueger and Yoo 2002, 603). This both encouraged foreign borrowing and 
discouraged the purchase of forward cover as an insurance against the risk of 
major exchange rate changes (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 606).
Korean state managers came under significant pressure by 1993 from the 
chaebol to liberalize short-term finance (Lee, Lee, and Lee 2000, 1). There 
is no question the move toward liberalized financial markets fit in with the 
Kim Young-sam government’s globalization priority and therefore served a 
political function. But this does not explain why both short-term and long-
term credit markets were not liberalized. Ironically, policymakers suggested 
that one of the strongest reasons for introducing competition in the market for 
bank loans was to mitigate the considerable economic power and influence 
of the chaebol. Indeed, controlling the excesses of big business throughout 
the liberalization process was an explicit goal for Korean policymakers (Au-
erbach 2001, 85–87).
The state first embarked upon financial liberalization in 1980 not with the 
idea of giving market forces free rein, but rather with the idea of building new 
institutions between the state and big business that would serve to ensure eco-
nomic control over big business irregularities and to prevent its dominance 
in the market. Korean officials saw liberalization as redefining the rules in 
order to continue meeting prudential objectives and prevent the exercise of 
cartel-like private market power. Part of the long-term liberalization plan was 
to restrict the privileged access of big business to policy loans and these busi-
nesses’ oligopolized production in the market (Rhee 1994, 154). Reform-
oriented officials firmly believed that economic liberalization would not be 
successful without preventing further business concentration. State control 
over big business served not only the state’s economic goals but also its polit-
ical goals. The Chun government (1981–88) put an emphasis on the political 
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goal of the welfare and justice society against the previous regime’s collusive 
state–big business ruling coalition, thus pinning the new regime’s legitimacy 
on its ability to control big business (Rhee 1994, 193).
Despite rather explicit state goals to avoid such outcomes, there is consider-
able evidence that the content and sequence of Korean liberalization ulti-
mately allowed the chaebol to take advantage of perverse incentives. That 
is, the rather unbalanced form that financial opening took was partially a 
result of the unyielding pressure from the chaebol, which saw short-term 
borrowing as a way to get around government restrictions on borrowing and 
investment decisions as well as the capitalization restrictions. Some observ-
ers have described the government strategy of liberalizing short-term bor-
rowing while leaving long-term borrowing regulated as government officials 
giving in where pressures were strong and holding back where it was not. 
Given the short-term nature of borrowing by nonbank financial institutions, 
the liberalization of the short-term market prior to the long-term market was 
an understandable outcome of interest politics. Between 1994 and 1996, for-
eign bank lending to Korea went from $52 to $108 billion. About $60 bil-
lion of debt outstanding in 1997 was used by the chaebol to finance direct 
investments abroad. Korean banks invested in foreign assets with funds bor-
rowed from foreign banks in the range of $23 billion (Haggard and Mo 2000, 
204). The reliance of the chaebol on bank borrowing—as opposed to equity 
or bond financing—increased leverage ratios and made the chaebol highly 
susceptible to bankruptcies when hit with shocks. In turn, the health of the 
banking sector became heavily dependent on the viability of the chaebol be-
cause such a high fraction of bank assets are in the form of lending to these 
enterprises (Dekle and Ubide 1998, 18). Korean financial institutions were 
overexposed to foreign exchange risk, and a high proportion of foreign li-
abilities had relatively short maturities. So, at the very least, deregulation of 
the financial sector in the early 1990s, together with ongoing features of the 
government-banking-chaebol relationship, increased Korea’s vulnerability to 
outside capital flows by creating the incentive for short-term indebtedness 
(Haggard and Mo 2000, 215).
Finally, large business groups throughout Asia benefited from the process of 
bank privatization. As many scholars have pointed out, privatization because 
of the large stakes involved is particularly prone to rent seeking and cap-
ture. In countries like Korea, government relaxation of controls over entry 
and ownership has led to the largest business groups’ domination of both 
the ownership of commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (Tan 
and Schneider, forthcoming). One result in Korea was that credit became 
concentrated, with the largest 30 business groups receiving more than 70 per-
cent of total short-term credit (Rhee 1994, 203). One potential sticking point 
for Korean officials was that, in order to strengthen banks, it was necessary 
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to end the ban on chaebol ownership of them. But bank privatization only 
strengthened the already powerful chaebol. In short, the privatization process 
allowed big business groups to capture an ever-increasing proportion of the 
banking sector, thereby fortifying the large business groups’ position in rela-
tion to government control.
Not all the pressures for liberalization were domestic. International pressures 
were also important. These can operate through a number of channels. One 
is through impersonal market forces; that is, the degree of international capi-
tal mobility can influence the costs and benefits of a wide array of financial 
strategies. Actions by other emerging-market governments may also have im-
portant effects through this channel. Liberalization of competitors raises the 
costs of continued restrictions in the home country.
A second is through influence on actors’ mental models. Although the extent 
of influence is open to debate, there can be little question that attitudes to-
ward financial liberalization had become much more favorable by the 1990s 
compared with the 1970s, and that the international transmission of ideas has 
a good deal to do with these changed attitudes.
A third channel is through direct pressure. This can come from the interna-
tional financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and via direct 
lobbying on emerging-market governments by international financial inter-
ests, but such pressures are perhaps more commonly intermediated by nation-
al governments in the industrialized countries (Bhagwati’s Wall Street–Trea-
sury complex). Lobbying, persuasion, and arm-twisting by industrial-country 
governments and the international financial institutions can come of course 
from the sincere belief that liberalization is in the best interests of the emerg-
ing-market countries. The relative influence of interests and ideas or ideology 
in this context will often be difficult if not impossible to tease out. Assum-
ing that bureaucrats throughout Asia have been reluctant to cede discretion-
ary power to the private sector, one could interpret the decision to liberal-
ize short-term finance as the result of market pressure. That is, international 
finance brought the most market pressure to bear in the short-term credit 
market in part because the volume of short-term financial flows was so much 
greater. In other words, bureaucrats failed to liberalize long-term finance be-
cause they possessed the capability to resist, whereas they could not resist the 
tide of market forces in the short-term financial market.
External pressure for financial-market opening can be extremely powerful. 
This is an area in which unintended consequences are of major importance. 
Sometimes the effects on emerging markets are the result of industrial-
country policies. Fluctuations in credit conditions in the rich countries have 
been shown to have strong effects on the size of international financial flows 
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to emerging markets. Less inevitably, the efforts of the industrial countries 
to develop better standards for risk management by the major international 
banks resulted in incentives for the banks to shift from longer-term to short-
term lending (Goodman and Pauly 1993; Cohen 1996). The so-called Ba-
sel Accord on capital adequacy standards for banks reflected a substantial 
achievement of international cooperation, but few noticed at the time that 
this was followed quickly by a dramatic increase in the ratio of short-term to 
long-term bank loans going to emerging markets. This was the result of the 
much higher ratios of capital required to back bank loans of over one year.
The Czech Republic, Mexico, and Korea were hit by a double whammy. By 
achieving sufficient economic and political success to be allowed to join the 
industrial countries as members of the OECD, they automatically qualified 
under the Basel rules for a lower risk category with lower capital require-
ments on loans. While not all international banks were following these regu-
latory rules, enough were so that the admissions of these countries to the 
OECD were followed by surges of capital inflows (concentrated of course on 
the short-term end). We also cannot totally discount the more formal external 
pressures to liberalize. In Korea, President Kim Young-sam’s desire to join 
the OECD, combined with pressure from the IMF and the U.S. government, 
may have led to the liberalization of domestic financial markets before exist-
ing weaknesses in the banking system, including poor regulatory and super-
visory framework, could be addressed (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 791). 
So, although some liberalization would undoubtedly have taken place in the 
absence of foreign pressure, the nature and timing of liberalization may have 
been acutely affected.
Perhaps the strangest aspect of Korea’s liberalization sequencing was the de-
cision to liberalize short-term capital flows before long-term ones—the exact 
opposite of the normally recommended sequencing. As Mishkin (2006, 88, 
29) explains, however, allowing an “unlimited short-term foreign borrowing 
by financial institutions while maintaining quantity restrictions on long-term 
borrowing . . . made no economic sense, . . . however [it] made complete po-
litical sense.” “. . .[This] allowed the government to say that it was still redi-
recting foreign capital inflows, and to claim that it was opening up to foreign 
capital in a prudent manner.” Just the opposite was the case, of course.
At least one minor contribution to the excessive short-term foreign borrow-
ing that developed was due to the unconsidered consequences of the interna-
tional efforts to improve financial systems’ stability through the Basel I capi-
tal requirements. These crude risk control measures drew a sharp distinction 
between countries that were and were not members of the OECD, so when 
Korea was admitted the capital requirements for some loans to Korea were 
substantially lowered for banks in countries following Basel I, then leading 
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to greater incentives for banks to lend to Korea. Although the revised dec-
larations in the Basel II agreement appeared to be much more sophisticated, 
the current crisis has shown that much of this apparent sophistication was an 
illusion, as little if anything had been done to improve consideration of the 
possible effects on systemic risk that might be generated by following the 
regulations.
Perhaps the most serious weakness in financial system oversight came, how-
ever, not from issues with the behavior of the commercial banks but from 
the merchant-banking sector that Mishkin (2006, 89) describes as “virtu-
ally unregulated.” In 1990 Korea had only six merchant banks, all affiliates 
of foreign banks. Wanting greater access to foreign borrowing, the chaebol 
launched a lobbying campaign that “persuaded government officials, often 
through bribery and kickbacks, to permit many finance companies which 
were not allowed to borrow abroad, to be converted into merchant banks, 
which could.” The result was that by the time of the crisis the number of 
merchant banks in Korea had grown to 30, 16 of which were controlled by 
the chaebol.
The result was a domestic credit boom financed heavily by foreign borrowing. 
Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion of credit led to an increasing proportion 
of lending of a dubious nature. Regulators in Korea were no more successful 
in limiting this problem than were U.S. regulators in taking action to head off 
the subprime crisis. The major problem was not that the regulatory agencies 
could not pay enough to hire competent supervisors. The danger signs were 
not difficult to see if one was looking. Rather the biggest problem (Mishkin 
2006, 93) was that “political pressure on bank supervision led to ‘regulatory 
forbearance,’ the supervisors were not forcing banking institutions to reveal 
these bad loans and were allowing insolvent institutions to stay in business.”
Given these problems, it seems likely that a major financial crisis was in-
evitable. The financial system was in much too fragile a state to weather the 
spillover from the crisis that started in Thailand. The result was huge capital 
outflows, substantial overdepreciation of the won, and widespread financial 
distress and economic hardship.
Postcrisis Liberalization
Fortunately Korea drew the right lessons from the Asian crisis concerning the 
financial sector. Instead of pushing for re-regulation, the government saw that 
more and especially better liberalization was needed, accompanied by greatly 
strengthened prudential supervision in order to improve the soundness of the 
financial system (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009; Kang 2009).
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A number of regulations on the banking sector and stock market, particu-
larly aimed at the foreign investors, were largely eased or eliminated. At the 
same time, incentives were created to induce foreign investors to return their 
investments or to attract new investors to Korea. In addition, after the Asian 
crisis, the Korean government nationalized many large domestic banks that 
were vulnerable to solvency risks, and Korean authorities also concurrently 
loosened some restrictions on the entry of foreign banks in order to attract 
foreign banks to purchase or merge those nationalized banks. In 1998, for 
example, the Emergency Economic Committee allowed foreigners to buy up 
to one-third of a company’s shares without prior approval of the target firm’s 
board of directors (Bekaert and Harvey 2004), foreign investors were allowed 
to directly participate in Korean banks through acquisition or through equity 
markets, and foreign banks were subject to the same restrictions as Korean 
banks. The Korean government also engaged in intensive financial reforms 
in order to strengthen its prudential regulation and supervision, increase its 
financial-market development, and improve corporate governance (Kim, 
Kim, and Suh 2009). An important aspect of this push was the creation of 
the Financial Supervisory Commission in 1999. The result has been a much 
sounder domestic financial system.
Korea has generally kept tighter restrictions on capital outflows than on capital 
inflows (Figure 5-1). During the crisis restrictions on inflows were reduced 
in order to moderate the downward pressure on the won; this was followed 
after the crisis by more liberalization of both capital inflows and outflows 
(Table 5-1). The regulations in several asset categories were lifted for both 
foreign and domestic investors; categories included securities, bonds, short-
term money market instruments, derivatives, collective investments, and real 
estate. In 1998, for example, foreigners were freed to purchase domestic col-
lective investment securities without restrictions; in 1998 domestic corpora-
tions were allowed to issue securities abroad with maturities of less than three 
years; in 1998 nonresidents were allowed to issue securities denominated in 
foreign currency (Bekaert and Harvey 2004); and in 2003 the government 
extended the range of foreign securities qualified for investment by residents 
(Ahn 2008). In 2007, restrictions on the investments by residents in overseas 
real estate were relaxed (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009).
Recent empirical research by Sompornserm (2009) has found that domestic 
financial liberalization in emerging markets often plays an important role in 
attracting foreign investors over and above capital account liberalization. The 
process of liberalization not only affects prices and returns on assets directly, 
but it also leads to an improvement of investors’ expectations about further 
economic policy reforms or acts as a signal of an improvement of economic 
policies, making foreign investors more confident about investing in the lib-
eralized countries. In addition, financial liberalization has on average had 
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Figure 5-1: Potchamanawong and Schindler Capital Control Indexes 
1995–2004
Sources: P. Potchamanawong, “A New Measurement of Capital Controls and Its Relation to 
Currency Crises” (Ph.D. dissertation for Claremont Graduate University, 2007); M. Schindler, 
“Measuring Financial Integration: A New Data Set,” IMF Staff Papers 56 (2009): 222–38.
Note: The Potchamanawong and Schindler capital control indexes range between 0 and 1. The 
higher value represents a higher degree of capital control.
Figure 5-2: Patterns of Foreign Capital Flows into South Korea 
1980–2008 
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations. 
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Table 5-1: Financial Liberalization in Korea after the Asian Financial 
Crisis, 1997–2007
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Table 5-1: cont.
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Table 5-1: cont.
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a strong influence in changing the composition of capital flows within the 
short-term flows, by tilting the structure of capital flows toward portfolio in-
vestment flows. This result suggests that an increase in the degree of financial 
liberalization can translate into greater financial-market deepening. Korea’s 
experience fits this general pattern.
Postcrisis Capital Flows
After the Asian financial crisis, international capital inflows to Korea reap-
peared, particularly in the form of equity flows and FDI flows as a result 
of domestic financial liberalization, capital account openness, and favorable 
macroeconomic conditions. Several factors contributed to large changes 
in the composition of capital inflows in Korea during 1999–2000, shifting 
Korean capital flows away from foreign loans toward FDI flows and equity 
flows. An increase in risk perceptions by foreign creditors as a result of the 
loss of confidence in Korean borrowers’ ability to repay their debts was one. 
Another was the lessons learned by Korean borrowers from the sudden stops 
and the reversals of foreign loans during the crisis. After 2000, a continuing 
surplus in current and capital accounts, which would put upward pressure on 
foreign exchange rates, led Korean authorities to encourage capital outflows 
by relaxing restrictions on capital outflows to overseas real estate, portfolio 
investments, and direct investment abroad (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009).
As we can see in Figure 5-2, by 1999 net capital flows had turned positive 
again, with especially large investments coming into the Korean stock market 
in 1999 and continuing on a large scale through 2004 with only the exception 
of 2002. Total net capital flows followed a similar pattern over these years. 
In 2005 total net inflows dropped, with inflows in the bond market and bank-
ing exceeding equity inflows. Bond sales and bank borrowing reached much 
higher levels in 2006 and 2007 while net foreign flows into the Korean stock 
market turned mildly negative in 2006, with net sales accelerating in 2007. At 
the same time, the loosening of restrictions on capital outflows led to a boom 
in purchases of foreign stocks and real estate by Korean residents. This led 
to sizable net portfolio equity outflows in 2006 and even larger ones in 2007 
(Figure 5-3). As a result, total net capital flows turned negative in 2007 (Fig-
ure 5-4). Note that this shift occurred before the effects of the U.S. subprime 
meltdown began to be felt in emerging markets.
The other especially notable feature of Korean capital flows between the cri-
ses was the rapid buildup of short-term foreign debt by the Korean bank-
ing sector beginning in 2006. The foreign borrowing by the Korean bank-
ing sector considerably increased from $1.1 billion in 2004 to $40 billion in 
2007, growing approximately 10-fold per year. In addition, during 2006–07, 
bank borrowing alone on average accounted for 45 percent of the capital 
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inflows. The substantial increase in foreign borrowing was in part a con-
sequence of the large portfolio outflows from Korean residents; Kim, Kim, 
and Suh (2009, 30) state that “capital outflows via overseas equity invest-
ment increased markedly, but at the same time investors (funds) sold forward 
exchange on a large scale to hedge against exchange rate risk, leading to a 
considerable increase in overseas foreign currency borrowing.” The increase 
was also caused in part by hedging against future export proceeds, especially 
from shipbuilding. This buildup in short-term foreign borrowing was gener-
ated largely by the Korean branches of international banks.
This rapid buildup illustrates how quickly international financial relations 
can change even in noncrisis periods. This accumulation of short-term for-
eign debt was carefully monitored by the Korean authorities, who judged 
that, because of the combination of the reasons for the borrowing, its con-
centration with Korean branches of international banks, and Korea’s ample 
supply of international reserves, this increase was not a major source of con-
cern despite its large size. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, this judgment 
was well founded in the sense that, during the current crisis, the decline in 
such debt has been fairly modest in contrast with the Asian crisis, but the 
large headline number helped contribute to considerable investor concerns 
during the crisis, which helped contribute to the dramatic plunge of the won.
Sizable portfolio outflows continued in 2008. In contrast, short-term bank 
debt, which had begun to surge in 2006, has remained at high levels. This is a 
substantial deviation from the pattern in the 1997–98 crisis, when reversals in 
the banking accounts were the major factor and the falloff in stock market in-
vestment was slight. To a substantial degree we can explain these differences 
in the patterns of capital flows by the differences in the nature of the crises. 
In 1997–98, the crisis was centered in Korea and focused on problems in the 
financial sector. Consequently, there was considerable risk to foreign lending 
to Korean banks, and it is not surprising that there were considerable outflows 
from the banking sector. The current crisis is centered in the United States, 
and the Korean banking sector is much sounder, although concerns have been 
expressed about the recent large accumulations of short-term foreign debt 
and the increasing reliance on wholesale funding. The behavior of capital 
flows during the current crisis will be discussed in Chapter 10.
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Figure 5-3: Patterns of South Korea’s Capital Outflow, 1980–2008
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
Figure 5-4: Patterns of Net Total Capital Flows for South Korea 
1980–2008 
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
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